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Abstract 
Financial institutions around the world use value-at-risk (VaR) models to manage their market risk and 
calculate their capital requirements under Basel Accords. VaR models, as any other risk management 
system, are meant to keep financial institutions out of trouble by, among other things, guiding investment 
decisions within established risk limits so that the viability of a business is not put unduly at risk in a 
sharp market downturn. However, some researchers have warned that the widespread use of VaR models 
creates negative externalities in financial markets, as it can feed market instability and result in what has 
been called endogenous risk, that is, risk caused and amplified by the system itself, rather than being the 
result of an exogenous shock. This paper aims at analysing the potential of VaR systems to amplify 
market disturbances with an agent-based model of fundamentalist and technical traders which manage 
their risk with a simple VaR model and must reduce their positions when the risk of their portfolio goes 
above a given threshold. We analyse the impact of the widespread use of VaR systems on different 
financial instability indicators and confirm that VaR models may induce a particular price dynamics that 
rises market volatility. These dynamics, which we have called ‘VaR cycles’, take place when a sufficient 
number of traders reach their VaR limit and are forced to simultaneously reduce their portfolio; the 
reductions cause a sudden price movement, raise volatility and force even more traders to liquidate part of 
their positions. The model shows that market is more prone to suffer VaR cycles when investors use a 
short-term horizon to calculate asset volatility or a not-too-extreme value for their risk threshold. 
 
Keywords: Value-at-risk; agent-based simulation; financial instability; volatility; risk limit; volatility 
window 
JEL Classification: C63; G1; G01; G20; G11; G17 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial institutions around the world use value-at-risk (VaR) models to measure their market 
risk (Feridun, 2005). This type of models were first used in Wall Street in the late 80s (Triana, 
2010), and after the launch in 1994 of the RiskMetrics VaR methodology by JP Morgan, they 
have become the mainstream methodology for financial risk management ( (IMF, 2007), 
(McNeil, Frey, & Embrechts, 2005)), as well as a fundamental part of the Basel Capital Accords 
since the 1996 Amendment on market risks (Shin, 2010). 
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VaR measures the maximum loss that an asset portfolio may suffer over a specific horizon and 
with a given level of confidence (Choudhry, 2006). For example, if the daily VaR of a portfolio 
is €1 million at 95% confidence, this means that the probability that daily losses are higher than 
€1 million is 5%. VaR constitutes an intuitive measure that was initially used to communicate 
financial risks to managers in an easy, understandable way; however, over time it has also been 
universally adopted to set position limits to traders, to allocate capital among different trading 
units, or to calculate the regulatory capital required under Basel Accords (Jorion, 2001). 
 
VaR models, as any other risk management system, are meant to keep financial institutions out 
of trouble by, among other things, guiding investment decisions within established risk limits so 
that the viability of a business is not put unduly at risk in a sharp market downturn. However, 
some researchers have warned that the widespread use of VaR models creates negative 
externalities in financial markets, as it can feed market instability and result in what has been 
called endogenous risk, that is, risk caused and amplified by the system itself, rather than being 
the result of an exogenous shock (Danielsson & Shin, 2002). Financial institutions usually set 
VaR limits to their traders or units, which are forced to reduce their positions when the risk 
exceeds these limits; when volatility increases, the VaR of trading portfolios also goes up and so 
traders can be forced to reduce their positions, but their sales can cause a price drop and so a 
new volatility upsurge, triggering further portfolio reductions. When many investors hold 
similar positions and also use the same type of risk management models, they may be forced to 
simultaneously sell the same assets, leading to an instabilising spiral ( (Danielsson, et al., 2001), 
(Persaud, 2000)). 
 
A paradigmatic example of this type of process is the turmoil that hit mature financial markets 
in Summer 1998 and which in the end led to the downfall of LTCM, one of the most successful 
hedge funds at the time ( (Davis, 1999), (Perold, 1999)). The Russian default on 17 August 
1998 forced the investors with exposure to the ruble debt market to liquidate positions to 
purchase safer, more liquid assets. This flight-to-quality raised the price of most liquid assets 
and plunged the price of illiquid ones (MacKenzie, 2003). The spread widening caused 
significant losses to LTCM and to the numerous investors that in previous years had imitated 
LTCM’s strategies dazzled by their impressive returns ( (BIS, 1999), (MacKenzie, 2003)). 
Some of these investors were forced to further reduce their portfolios, resulting in a self-feeding 
spread widening. The mounting losses brought LTCM to the brink of collapse, and only a 
rescue organised in extremis by the Fed was able to avoid its failure and the subsequent 
systemic crisis that it would certainly have caused (IMF, 2007). 
 
In a report on the events of 1998 (BIS, 1999), the Committee on the Global Financial System of 
the Bank for International Settlements provides a telling account of the deficiencies in current 
risk management methodologies, which were perceived by market participants to have played a 
major role in the 1998 crisis. According to the BIS findings, the ubiquitous use of VaR-based 
risk management tools might have contributed to no small extent to the propagation of initially 
localised disturbances. This concern was shared by all interviewed market participants, who 
described how the increase in VaR due the higher volatility forced many investors to reduce 
simultaneously their exposure, thereby draining liquidity from the markets and raising the 
upward pressure on volatility. 
 
So risk management control such as that proposed by the Basel Accords can, paradoxically, 
facilitate the contagious spread of instabilities, because they contribute to synchronise the 
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behaviour of market participants, which may be forced to liquidate part of their positions 
simultaneously ( (IMF, 2007), (Whitehead, 2013)). The impact of these liquidations would be 
negligible if investors had very different portfolios, as the selloffs by some agents would have 
no effect on those with different positions. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that 
financial institutions such as hedge funds and big banks accumulate similar positions ( (Pericoli 
& Sbracia, 2010), (Haldane & May, 2011)), and diverse regulators have warned of the risk this 
may pose to the liquidity of those markets where they invest ( (Bank of England, 2004), (ECB, 
2007)). In particular, this concern was raised during the hearing held by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in September 2009 to elucidate the role that risk-management systems and 
specially VaR played in credit crunch of 2007-08: 
 
“[A]sset-pricing and risk management tools are developed from an individualistic 
perspective, taking as given (ceteris paribus) the behavior of all other market participants. 
However, popular models might be used by a large number or even the majority of market 
participants. Similarly, a market participant (e.g., the notorious Long-Term Capital 
Management) might become so dominant in certain markets that the ceteris paribus 
assumption becomes unrealistic. The simultaneous pursuit of identical micro strategies 
leads to synchronous behavior and mechanic contagion. This simultaneous application 
might generate an unexpected macro outcome that actually jeopardizes the success of the 
underlying micro strategies.” (Colander, 2009, p. 10) 
 
This paper aims at analysing the potential of VaR systems to amplify market disturbances with 
an agent-based model where traders set position limits and must reduce their positions when the 
VaR of their portfolio is above the limit
2
. As seen above, we are not the first to warn on the 
detrimental effects that the widespread use of risk management systems can have in market 
stability, but we are able to analyse their impact on different instability indicators and to study 
under which conditions the market is more prone to show turmoil episodes. 
 
In recent years, a few equilibrium-based models have already been developed to study the link 
between risk constraints and heightened volatility. Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2004) 
consider a continuum of risk-averse traders that determine their portfolio to maximise their 
next-period utility. A risk contraint is incorporated in the model through traders’ beliefs, which 
are affected by the variance of past returns, and the results show that the widespread use of this 
type of risk contraint exacerbates market volatility. The authors reach a similar conclusion with 
a rational expectations model of stochastic volatility (Danielsson, Shin, & Zigrand, 2009) where 
risk-neutral agents maximise their expected returns subject to a VaR constraint. Tasca and 
Battiston (2012) consider a balance sheet approach where traders maintain a constant leverage 
level, which is equivalent to maintaining a constant VaR level; this creates a positive feedback 
between prices and leverage that amplifies shocks in prices and results in higher systemic risk 
when the price is very responsive to traders’ action.  
                                                     
2
 This process has similarities with the loss spirals identified by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), 
which affect market liquidity: when investors are leveraged and their assets lose value, their losses mount 
and leverage goes up. In order to continue getting access to credit it is necessary to have a minimum 
margin, and thus there is a limit on their leverage level. To keep a constant level of leverage and avoid 
surpassing this limit, investors are forced to reduce their portfolio, what may move prices in an 
unfavourable direction (the more illiquid the market, the greater the impact in prices) and cause new 




The study of the effects of risk constraints on market dynamics is related to the literature on the 
leverage cycle. The seminal paper by John Geanakoplos (1997), further developed in 
subsequent contributions ( (2003), (2009)) provides a leverage cycle theory based on collateral 
general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. A key factor in these models is the 
heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs: optimistic investors are natural buyers, and they leverage their 
positions thanks to the credit provided by less optimistic investors. But when bad news come, 
the shock is amplified through two mechanisms: a redistribution of wealth from optimistic to 
pessimistic agents, and a negative impact in average expectations. Fostel and Geanakoplos 
(2008) extend this model to show that a leverage cycle in one asset class can extend to different, 
unrelated asset classes. Hoelle (2016) also considers a multi-asset version of the Geanakoplos 
model framework to analyse the effect of dependent beliefs on endogenous leverage. The 
leverage cycle can also be explained by the use of VaR-like rules. Adrian and Shin (2013) 
explore with a simple contract model the procyclical relationship between leverage of financial 
intermediaries and credit supply and show that the leverage cycle can be caused by the use of 
risk management rules by financial intermediaries. Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) also study 
the link between intermediary leverage cycle and risk-based capital constraints with a dynamic 
general equilibrium model of the macroeconomy where – in contrast to Geanakoplos model – 
markets are complete and debt contracts are not collateralised. Thurner (2012) provides another 
perspective on the leverage cycle with an agent-based model where value investors can borrow 
to leverage their traders, and they find that this behaviour results in fat tails and clustered 
volatility. Aymanns and Farmer (2015) indirectly study the effect of VaR constraints by means 
of a model where fundamentalist investors set a maximum leverage limit which is linked to a 
VaR limit, and show that market dynamics turn out to be countercyclical (procyclical) when 
leverage is (inversely) proportional to volatility. Aymanns et al. (2016) build on the previous 
model to study the effect of different regulations on the leverage cycle. 
 
Some agent-based models have dealt with the impact of VaR systems. These models allow to go 
beyond the limitations of equilibrium-based models as they make it possible to model complex 
interactions among heterogeneous, bounded-rationality agents ( (Bookstaber, 2012), (Trichet, 
2011)). Takahashi (2013) focuses on the impact of VaR systems on market efficiency and his 
simulations with a fundamentalist-only population show that the stricter agents are in their risk 
management, the bigger the distance between the price and the fundamental value. Faria and 
Phelps (2011) and Faria (2012) explore the effect of VaR limits à la Basel III on market 
stability, considering a population of agents with a richer behaviour: they maximise their utility 
based on expectations that combine a fundamental and a technical component with a genetic 
algorithm. The authors conclude that the introduction of VaR restrictions can force agents to 
reduce their positions simultaneously and increases market volatility. Hermsen (2010) presents 
a model where traders use a fundamentalist or technical strategy subject to Basel II regulation 
and results similarly show that instability increases when the proportion of regulated agents 
goes up.  
 
From a more general perspective, this paper can be inscribed in a wider field within 
heterogeneous agent models aimed at identifying the mechanisms behind market bubbles and 
crashes. Different explanations have been provided for the boom and bust dynamics, which in 
rough outlines revolve around two types of mechanisms: variable populations of agents, due e.g. 
to imitation, herding, or switching between strategies in search of higher profits (e.g. (Brock & 
Hommes, 1998), (Chen & Yeh, 2001), (De Grauwe & Grimaldi, 2004), (Lux, 1995) or 
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(Westerhoff, 2009)) or the presence of financial constraints as in the present paper (see e.g. 
(Duffy & Ünver, 2006), (Thurner, Farmer, & Geanakoplos, 2012)). 
 
Relative to the previous literature on the effect of risk constraints, our paper has a variety of 
strengths in the model calibration and analysis: we are not only interested in showing that VaR 
constraints can contribute to increase market instability, but will study how the different 
parameters of a VaR model impact on market dynamics; our base model has been previously 
calibrated to reproduce the most important stylised facts of stock markets (Llacay, 2015) to 
increase the validity of our results; finally, we do not only focus on market volatility as a proxy 
of market instability, but we analyse a range of different instability indicators to provide a wider 
perspective on market behaviour under VaR constraints. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our agent-based 
model and describe how market stability will be measured. In section 3 we use the model to 
study the effect of VaR position limits on the price dynamics and the market stability, and 
section 4 then concludes our discussion. 
 
 
2. Model description 
We consider a market for a single risky asset – a stock – in unrestricted supply, where traders 
place orders at discrete trading intervals, changing the composition of their investment 
portfolios in accordance with their respective valuation model and, in the case where portfolio 
risk limits apply, with a Value-at-Risk (VaR) model. 
 
2.1. Price formation 
The price Pt for the stock is set by a market maker in accordance to a linear price formation rule. 
Although other formulations are possible (see e.g. (Madhavan, 2000) for a survey), we use the 
simplest one, which states that prices have to rise (fall) in the presence of over-demand (over-
supply) by an amount that is inversely proportional to the liquidity of the traded security. Here, 
we do not take into account the inventory of the market maker nor the presence of information 




11 tttt PP 

   ( 1 ) 
where 
 1t  is the total excess order, that is the sum of all orders emitted in t-1 
   is a constant liquidity factor that accounts for the depth of the market 
 t  is a random term, ),0(~ Pt N  , that accounts for the random perturbations – such 
as the arrival of new information – that can possibly affect the market-maker’s decision 
making process. 
 
One disadvantage of this linear formulation is that prices can become negative, which could be 
avoided by using a log-price formulation for the price discovery rule. Outstanding orders in any 
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given trading interval are always filled at the quoted prices and the market maker absorbs the 
excess or covers the shortfall, adjusting the prices according to the impact function ( 1 ). 
 
2.2. Trading strategies 
In stock markets, two main investment approaches can be identified (Bonenkamp, 2010): 
 
 Fundamentalist trading – Fundamentalist investors argue that assets have an intrinsic 
value, which can be determined with a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the 
asset, its issuer and the market (Murphy, 1999). The price is expected to move around 
the fundamental value, so when both diverge an investment opportunity appears: if the 
value exceeds the price the asset is said to be overvalued and it should be bought; if the 
value is lower than the price, then it should be sold (Malkiel, 1973).  
 Technical analysis – This aproach builds on the analysis of past price movements to 
infere its future evolution. It claims that markets are driven by psychological factors – 
which reflect investors’ hopes and fears – rather than fundamentals (O'Neill, 2011). 
Technical analysis is much more recent than fundamentalist trading; its use largely 
spread since the 60s and is has come to dominate the most modern and liquid markets 
(Johnson, Jefferies, & Ming Hui, 2003). 
 
Building on these trading approaches, we consider in the model two types of investors: 
fundamentalist traders (FUND) and technical traders (TREND). This combination of strategies 
is relatively frequent in agent-based models of financial markets as these are the mainstream 
trading approaches in stock markets (see, for example, (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer, & 
Tayler, 1996), (Lux & Marchesi, 2000) or (Farmer & Joshi, 2002)). We describe next in detail 
how we implement both types of agents in our model. 
 
2.2.1. Fundamentalist traders (FUND) 
Our implementation of the fundamental strategy is based on (Farmer & Joshi, 2002). 
Fundamentalist investors derive the intrinsic value of the stock from a private, exogenous signal 
they receive before each trading period. This exogenous signal is modelled as a random walk 
,tV  plus an agent-specific constant 




t vVV    where  ,1 ttt VV    ( 2 ) 
where t  is drawn from a normal distribution with constant variance,  Vt N  ,0~ , and the 
agent-specific constant fv  is set at the start of the simulation from a uniform distribution, 
),(~ maxmin vvUv
f , with maxmin vv  . 
 
The positions of fundamentalist traders are proportional to the difference of actual price tP  to 
perceived fundamental value ftV . However, an agent only enters a position when the different 
between price and value is above a given threshold, ft
f




                                                     







t PVpos  . ( 3 ) 
Let’s note that when the price lies above the fundamental value, the asset is overpriced and the 
agent decides to sell; when the price lies below the fundamental value, then the agent decides to 
buy. 
 
Fundamentalist investors keep their positions open until the price and the fundamental value 
converge, that is, until their difference is smaller than a given threshold. In that case, the agents 
liquidate their position:  
If  01 
f




t PV    then   0
f
tpos . 
If  01 
f




t PV    then   0
f
tpos . 
( 4 ) 
 
In case an agent has an open position, but the liquidation condition is not satisfied, then it 
simply updates its position based on the diference between price and value: if this difference has 
reduced (widened) since the position was opened, then the investors also reduces (increments) 





t PVpos  . ( 5 ) 
 
Fundamentalist investors are heterogeneous in their entry and exit thresholds 
),(~),,(~ maxminmaxmin  UTTUT
ff . 
 






t pospos 1 . ( 6 ) 
 





Figure 1 – State diagram of the fundamentalist strategy 
 
2.2.2. Technical traders (TREND) 
Technical traders exploit price trends, and for that aim we have implemented two of the most 
common techniques in real markets (Taylor S. , 2005): to detect the start of a trend in prices, 
agents compare a short- and a long-term moving average of past prices; to detect the end of a 
price trend, agents rely on the technique of channel breakouts. To implement these rules, we 
have built on the practitioner literature, mainly on the description provided in (Kestner, 2003). 
 
At each time step, technical investors calculate two simple moving averages (MA) of past 
prices: one short-term MA that responds quickly to recent price movements, and a long-term 
MA that responds more slowly. Let trSw  and 
tr
Lw  be the windows used by the technical agent tr 
to calculate his short- and long-term moving averages, respectively. The moving averages are 





































( 7 ) 
 
When the two moving averages cross, it is the key time to buy or sell: if the short-term MA 
crosses the long-term MA from below, the agent interprets it as the beginning of an upward 
trend and opens a long position; if the short-term MA crosses the long-term MA from above, the 





Figure 2 – Illustration of the behaviour of long- and short-term moving averages 
 
When the MA’s cross and the agent opens a position, it is proportional to the difference in slope 
between the two moving averages, because it is assumed that the greater this difference, the 
steeper the upward or downward price trend. Equations ( 8 ) and ( 9 ) specify the formula used 
by technical investors to calculate their position: 
 If t
tr
SwMA )(  crosses t
tr




t inclpos  25  ( 8 ) 
 If t
tr
SwMA )(  crosses t
tr




t inclpos  25 , ( 9 ) 
where 
 25 is a normalisation factor aimed at having the same order of magnitude in the orders 
from fundamentalist and technical agents. 
 trtincl   is the difference between the slope of the two MA’s: 
   11 )()(arctan)()(arctan   ttrLttrLttrSttrStrt wMAwMAwMAwMAincl  
 
Technical investors keep their positions open until they think that the price trend has begun to 
reverse. In order to detect a trend reversal, the agents use a channel breakout rule: if the current 
price is the lowest in the last trCw  days, then the technical trader interprets that the price is going 
down, and any long position should be liquidated; if the current price is the highest in the last 
tr
Cw  days, then the technical trader interprets that the price is going up, and any short position 
should be liquidated. 
Open long position 
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   then   0trtpos . 
If  01 
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   then   0trtpos . 
( 10 ) 
 
Note that when drawing the minimum and the maximum of the price over a period, a channel 
appears, which is why the method is called “channel breakout” (Figure 3). 
 
As happens with the fundamentalist investors, when a technical agent has an open position, but 
the channel breakout conditions is not satisfied, then he simply updates his position keeping the 
same sign: 
If  01 
tr




t inclpos  25  
If  01 
tr




t inclpos  25 . 
( 11 ) 
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t pospos 1 . ( 12 ) 
 
Figure 4 summarises how the technical strategy works: 
 
 
Figure 3 – Illustration of the behaviour of the channel used as exit condition 
Close long position 









Figure 4 – State diagram of the technical strategy 
 
2.2.3. Value-at-risk model 
Up to this point, we have assumed that agents exclusively relied on valuation models to 
determine the number of shares to buy or sell in any given time step. To account for the market 
risk of the portfolio, we now introduce a risk model based on VaR position limits. We assume 
that for a given portfolio and time horizon ttt hh   the variation of the portfolio value is 
distributed normally with mean 0 and normalised variance 2t . An estimate for the 
maximum loss of the portfolio value PValue  for the confidence level α is 
h
P
ttt tValuezVaR   1 , ( 13 ) 
where 1z  is the percentile of the normal distribution corresponding to a level of confidence 
equal to  . 
 
Let t  be the order that an investor wants to issue according to its fundamentalist or technical 
strategy. Before sending this order to the market maker, the agent calculates the 1-tick VaR of 
the position it would have in the stock if the order t  became effective: 
ttttt PposzVaR    11 . ( 14 ) 
 
In case the VaR of the desired position (equation ( 13 )) does not exceeds the VaR limit LVaR of 
the agent, the order is sent to the market maker to calculate the new price; otherwise, the agent 










pospos   )( 1  . ( 15 ) 
 





t pospos . ( 16 ) 
 
Traders are heterogeneous in ther VaR limit and in the window used to calculate the volatility of 
the assets: 
).,(~),,(~ maxminmaxmin
 wwUwLVaRLVaRULVaR  
 
2.2.4. Measuring financial instability 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the widespread use of VaR systems on 
market stability. It is difficult to define what financial stability exactly is, but all the proposed 
definitions agree that financial stability is linked to the absence of crises, stress or excessive 
volatility (Gadanecz & Jayaram, 2008). It is even more difficult to measure financial stability: 
to this aim, central banks and other regulators use indices that combine simple indicators that 
provide information not only on financial markets but also on real economy or corporate sector 
to account for the fact that financial stability is connected to the proper functioning of the 
macroeconomic environment (Manamperi, 2013). Our model is just a stylised version of a stock 
market, and so we cannot implement stability indicators pertaining to any sector other than 
financial markets. Building on the real-world indicators used by regulators in this sector, we 
will implement the following indicators of financial instability, which essentially measure the 
intensity of price movements and the fragility of market participants: 
 
 Return volatility: Market volatility, which measures the size of price movements 
(Gadanecz & Jayaram, 2008), is the most usual indicator of financial stability (The 
World Bank, 2013). We define volatility as the standard deviation of the return series of 





















r is the average of returns ir  calculated within the same window w . 




























r is the mean and ir  is the standard deviation of returns ir , both calculated 
within the window w . Kurtosis measures the size of the tails of the probability 
distribution of returns (Tsay, 2005), and so it has been used as an indicator of financial 
                                                     
4 In fact, we implement excess kurtosis, which is equal to 3i
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stability ( (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009), (Peters, 2014)), since a higher value of 
kurtosis is a sign of a higher frequency of extreme returns. However, it must be pointed 
out that kurtosis is quite sensitive to the appearance of outliers because the deviation of 
each observation with respect to the mean is raised to the fourth power (Rebonato, 
2007). 
 Hill tail index: Apart from kurtosis, the behaviour of the tails of the return distribution 
can be described through the tail index. In recent years it has been determined that the 
complementary cumulative distribution function of returns asymptotically follows a 




and so the descent of the probability density function also follows a power law 
distribution in the tails with exponent 1  (Cristelli, 2014). The exponent   
coincides with the so-called tail index of the return distribution, which measures the 
order of the largest absolute moment that is finite (for example, the tail index of a 
normal distribution is ∞ because all of its moments are finite, and the greater this index 
is, the thinner the distribution tails are) (Cont, 2001). The exponent   is usually 
estimated with the Hill index
6
, which is the maximum-likelihood estimator of the tail 
index (Einarsson, 2013). So, when the Hill index of the return series takes a low value, 
it indicates that returns are more likely to take extreme values, what is a sign of 
heightened instability (Hermsen, 2010). 
 Investor strength: Building on the z-score used to measure the fragility of banks (Beck, 
De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2011), we define an indicator of investor strength as the ratio 
between the end-of-simulation accumulated profits and the standard deviation of these 
final profits. This indicator provides an idea of the consistency of traders’ results and so 
of their stability. 
 
2.2.5. Parameters 
Table 1 summarises the value of all the model parameters used in the results described next. 
When choosing these values, we have applied the following criteria: 
 For those parameters that are a direct adaptation of real strategy parameters, we have 
simply chosen realistic values. 
 For those parameters not ‘observable’ in real markets, we have adjusted their value with 
the aim of obtaining reasonable price dynamics that satisfy as much as possible the 
stylised facts of stock markets ( (Cont, 2001), (Taylor S. , 2005)). In particular, the 
model captures the following properties: 
                                                     










6 Let k  be the number of observations in the tail of a distribution. If these observations are sorted in 

















o Lack of return autocorrelation: The autocorrelation function of the return series 
obtained from the simulations tend to 0 when the lag increases. 
o Fat tails: The distribution of the return series obtained from the model is more 
leptokurtic than the normal distribution. Returns present excess kurtosis, and 
their histogram has more mass in the center and the tails than a normal 
distribution. 
o Volatility clustering: The autocorrelation function of volatility –estimated either 
as the absolute value or the square of returns – remains positive for several lags, 
and volatility presents long-term memory. 
o Correlation between volume and volatility: The correlation between trading 
volume (calculated as the sum of orders issued by all the agents in absolute 
value) and volatility is positive. 
o Volume autocorrelation: The autocorrelation function of the volume series 
obtained from simulations remains positive for several lags and decays slowly 
to 0, and volume has long-term memory. 
 
Next, we describe in more detail how we have calibrated each parameter
7
: 
 Parameters associated to price formation: The impact of traders in price formation is 
normalised with the liquidity parameter  , so this parameter is linked to the number of 
agents (the higher the trader population size, the higher the liquidity). Although this 
parameter has an empirical interpretation, its value is not observable, and it has then 
been calibrated by looking at the stylised facts replicated by the model. 
The random term in price formation (see formula ( 1 )) is governed by the standard 
deviation parameter P , whose value has been set to obtain an overall price volatility 
value in line with empirical daily volatility of S&P500 (assuming here that one time 
step is equivalent to one trading day). 
 Parameters associated to fundamental value formation: The fundamental value process 
depends on the standard deviation term V . This has been calibrated based on the 
stylised facts replicated by the model. 
 Parameters associated to the fundamentalist strategy: Although we do not have 
empirical evidence on which thresholds are used by fundamentalist traders, we have 
used plausible values for the mispricing level required to enter and exit a position ( fT ,
f ), and we have fine-tuned these values – together with the unobservable parameter 
f  – by looking at the stylised facts replicated by the model. 
 Parameters associated to the technical strategy: To implement the technical trading 
strategy, we have built on techniques widely used in real markets, and so when it came 
to setting the values of the different windows we turned to the practitioner literature. 




Lw ) move around 10 
and 40 as these are the values usually employed by real technical investors (Kestner, 
2003); the window for the exit channel moves around 20 as this is the typical period 
(Milton, 2016). 
 
                                                     
7 The calibration has been done before introducing the VaR model, to have a valid testbed where to study 
the effect of risk management practices. 
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Parameter Value Parameter description 
ticksN  4000 Number of ticks (or time steps) of each run 
  400 Liquidity 
0P  100 Initial price 
P  0.4 Standard deviation for random term in price formation 
FUNDN  200 Number of fundamentalist traders 
TRENDN  200 Number of technical traders 
V  0.25 
Standard deviation for random term in fundamental value 
formation 
],[ maxmin
ff vv  [-8, 8] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the 
difference between the fundamental value and the value 
perceived by each fundamentalist trader 
],[ maxmin
ff TT  [2, 5] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the entry 
thresholds of fundamentalist traders 
],[ maxmin
ff   [-0.5, 1] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the exit 





S ww  [5, 15] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the 






L ww  [35, 50] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the 






C ww  [5, 30] 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the 
window of exit channel used by technical traders 
  99% Confidence level 
],[ maxmin LVaRLVaR  Variable 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the VaR 
limit of each agent 
],[ maxmin
 ww  Variable 
Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the 
window used to calculate the stock volatility 





3. Model results 
In this section we will study how the use of VaR position limits impacts price dynamics and 
market stability, and will analyse the effect of the different parameters of the VaR model. In all 
the experiments, simulations have a duration of 4000 time steps (in order to calibrate variables 
such as price volatility we assume that each time step is equivalent to 1 day, and so each run has 
an equivalent duration of 16 years). Ech experiment consists of 50 runs and uses the parameters 
listed in Table 1. We are using identical random number sequences across the different 
experiments so that the results become comparable. 
 
3.1. Effect of using VaR systems 
We study next the effect of using VaR-based position limits in the instability indicators 
described in section 2.2.4. We consider a one-asset market where the proportion of traders – 
both fundamentalist and technical investors – that manage their risk with VaR limits rises across 
experiments from 0% to 100%. That is, in the first experiment no agent uses VaR, whereas in 
the last experiment all agents are using VaR. We assume that all traders are homogeneous in 




Figure 5 shows the evolution of the different instability indicators
8
 when the percentage of 
traders using a VaR system increases from 0% to 100%. The four indicators show that the 
market becomes more unstable when most traders manage their risk with VaR limits: the 
volatility of returns heightens, the kurtosis of returns rises and their Hill tail index goes down – 
which indicates that extreme returns are more frequent –, and the index of trader strength also 
worsens – because the dispersion of agent profits increases. When a high percentage of traders 
are using VaR limits, the average market instability increases because of the emergence in some 
runs of a particular price dynamics which we have called ‘VaR cycles’. In fact, the outliers 
observed in Figure 5 are realised in those runs where VaR cycles are specially remarkable. Let’s 
have a look at a particular simulation to describe in detail the functioning of such cycles. 
 
                                                     
8 The volatility/kurtosis boxplots show the mean of the return volatility/kurtosis entire time series – 
calculated over a rolling window of 20 time steps – obtained for each of the 50 runs. 
The line plot for the strength index shows the ratio of the mean of the end-of-simulation wealth across the 







Figure 5 – Evolution of instability indicators when the percentage of agents using VaR increases from 






Description of a VaR cycle 
Figure 6 compares the price time series obtained in a particular simulation when (1) no agent 
uses VaR limits (in black), and (2) when all the agents use a VaR model with a limit 40LVaR  
and a volatility window 20w  (in red). A different behaviour can be appreciated from t = 
2900 onwards. For better clarity, a zoom of the price series for t = 3200..3500 is provided in 
Figure 7 to appreciate the differences in price dynamics. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Comparison of price time series for a particular run when no agent uses VaR (in black), and 
when all the agents use VaR (in red) 
 
 
Figure 7 – Zoom in t = 3200-3500 of the comparison of price time series for a particular run when no 




Price behaviour from t = 2900 on is due to the trader action after reaching their VaR limit. 
Figure 8 exhibits the VaR of agents’ portfolio, averaged over fundamentalist and technical 
investors. This VaR is calculated with the positions that agents would accumulate if they were 
allowed in the current time step to buy or sell the amount dictated by their trading strategy. 
From t = 2900 onwards, agents’ VaR exceeds their LVaR limit – represented with a horizontal, 
red line –, and so traders are forced to forget about their ‘desired’ orders and need to reduce 
their portfolio to keep their VaR below the limit. 
 
 
Figure 8 – VaR time series of agents’ portfolio for a particular run, averaged over fundamentalist (in 
orange) and technical (in green) traders 
 
Note that major price movements are caused by agents reducing their portfolio, but this does not 
mean that price exhibits VaR cycles everytime that an agent is forced to liquidate part of its 
positions. In fact, there are some fundamentalist agents that touch their VaR limit before t = 
2900 and are thus forced to reduce their positions, but the average VaR over all the 
fundamentalist population lies below the limit as seen in Figure 8. As these reductions are small 
compared to the total trading volume, their impact on price is minor. However, when most 
agents accumulate substantial positions and their portfolio VaR is close to the limit, any small 
upsurge in volatility can make VaR rise above the limit and force traders to liquidate positions. 
When a number of traders must reduce their portfolio at the same time, these reductions have a 
noticeable impact on the price and, in turn, on volatility. 
 
Figure 9 shows the time series of price, return volatility and ‘forced’ portfolio reductions of 
fundamentalist (in orange) and technical traders (in green). When these reductions are different 
from zero, it indicates that at least some agents not only cannot send to the market their 
‘desired’ order – that is, the order dictated by their trading strategy –, but are forced to partially 
liquidate their positions to reduce their VaR to an acceptable level. It can be observed that 
within the interval t = 3200-3500 – zoomed in Figure 10 –, the first substantial portfolio 
reductions around t = 3260 push the price down and the volatility up, but this process keeps 
along for a while because the increase in volatility rises again the VaR of agents, which must 





Figure 9 – Time series of prices, annualised return volatility and portfolio reductions of fundamentalist 
(in orange) and technical traders (in green) for a particular run 
 
When agents have sufficiently reduced their portfolio, their orders get smaller and the price 
decline slows down. Volatility remains high while the window over which it is calculated still 
includes the first major movements in price. Nevertheless, when time goes by and volatility 
decreases, traders start trading again as usual. If there is some coordination between investors 
and they simultaneously buy or sell, then the price movements can be substantial enough to rise 
again volatility and cause agents to reach their VaR limit. The ‘VaR cycle’ may thus repeat once 
more (see for example the portfolio reductions around t = 3310, 3330, 3350, etc. which plunge 





Figure 10 – Zoom in t = 3200-3500 of the time series of prices, annualised return volatility and portfolio 
reductions of fundamentalist (in orange) and technical traders (in green) for a particular run 
 
In the experiments just described we have seen that the higher the proportion of agents using 
VaR, the higher the possibility that VaR cycles emerge, that is, episodes where the reduction of 
positions by some traders rises the volatility enough to force other agents to sell off part of their 
holdings to reduce their exposure, thereby increasing volatility again and reinforcing the 
instabilisation spiral. Given that the market is more likely to suffer instability bouts when all of 
the agents use a VaR system, our experiments suggest that, at the global level, it would be more 
beneficial that not all of the investors control their positions with a VaR-based limit; they could 
use other types of risk management models, or at least they could use more flexible limits that 
do not force them to reduce their portfolio automatically when exceeding their risk threshold. 
 
The appearance of VaR cycles largely depends on the value of the parameters used by traders in 
their VaR model. For this reason, we will study next the effect of the volatility window and the 
VaR limit in the potential market instabilisation. 
 
3.2. Effect of volatility window 
We will explore next the impact of a varying value of the window used to calculate volatility in 
the VaR model, w . This analysis is relevant to certain discussions about the effects of VaR 
systems: the potentially destabilising effect of VaR models puts into question the adequacy of 
the capital requirements set out in the Basel Accords, which may exacerbate the episodes of 
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financial instability that they are precisely intended to prevent (Persaud, 2000). However, Jorion 
(2002) rebuts this argument, and one of his main points focuses on the volatility window: the 
Basel Accords stipulate that the observation period for historical data should be at least one 
year, and this highly reduces the sensitivity of VaR to daily price movements. Our analysis 
contributes to this debate by analysing the smoothing effect of high values of the volatility 
window. 
 
We consider a one-asset market where all investors manage their risk with VaR. They are 
heterogeneous in their VaR limit, which takes values between 30 and 50, and use the same 
window to calculate the asset volatility. All parameters remain constant across the experiments 





Figure 11 summarises the evolution of the different instability indicators when the volatility 
window increases from 5w  to 50w . The four indicators show that the market is clearly 
more prone to turmoil episodes when the volatility window takes low values
9
, and the effect of 
this parameter becomes less noticeable when the volatility window is higher than 23, 
approximately. When volatility is calculated using a small window, that is, considering just a 
few observations, each of these observations has a great weight in the outcome, and volatility 
turns out to be very sensitive to recent price movements. So when the volatility window is 
small, VaR can significantly increase from one tick to the next, whereas when volatility is 
calculated with a higher window, a much sharper price variation is required for volatility to 
notice it.  
 
 
                                                     
9 Kurtosis shows a somewhat different pattern: it takes more extreme values when volatility window lies 
between 11 and 20 days, rather than in the first experiments where volatility window takes smaller values. 
This is curiously due to the minor frequency of VaR cycles: there are still periods of instability, but they 
are a bit less frequent. As kurtosis is very sensitive to the presence of outliers (see section 2.2.4), it can 
take higher values when there are bouts of instability of the same magnitude than in the first experiments, 






Figure 11 – Evolution of instability indicators when the volatility window increases from 5 to 50. 
From top to bottom: return volatility, return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and agent strength index. 
 
 
These experiments show that using a medium- or long-term window to calculate volatility 
highly reduces the appearance of VaR cycles because volatility becomes less sensitive to price 
movements
10
. In fact, this sensitivity clearly moderates when the volatility window is beyond 23 
days or, to put it another way, when volatility is calculated over a horizon of one month or 
longer. In connection to the debate about the role of the Basel Accords in exacerbating 
instability episodes, our results indicate that Jorion (2002) is right in noting that capital 
                                                     
10
 This result is in agreement with (Aymanns, Caccioli, Farmer, & Tan, 2016), where the authors observe 
in quite a different model from ours that using a longer time horizon for computing volatility increases the 
stability of the financial system. 
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requirements do not contribute to increasing market instability because they are based on at least 
one year of historical data, and so volatility reacts slowly to market movements. 
 
3.3. Effect of VaR limit 
We will explore now the impact of a varying value of the position limit LVaR used by the 
agents to control the risk of their portfolio. We consider a one-asset market where all investors 
manage their risk with VaR. They are heterogeneous in their volatility window, which takes 
values between 10 and 30, and use the same VaR limit. All parameters remain constant across 
the experiments except for the VaR limit, which increases from 5LVaR  in the first 
experiment to 65LVaR  in the last experiment: 
65...,,11,8,5LVaR  
)30,10(~ Uw  
 
Figure 11 summarises the evolution of the different instability indicators when the VaR limit 
increases from 5LVaR  to 65LVaR . The four indicators show that the market is more 
unstable when the VaR limit takes intermediate values (around 11-26), because VaR cycles are 
then more likely to emerge. On the one hand, if the VaR limit takes a low value, this 
considerably constrains the positions that agents can take, because the VaR of their portfolio is 
proportional to the asset positions. So, even though they reach their limit more frequently and 
are forced to reduce their portfolio, they cannot send large orders to the market because their 
positions are not huge, and VaR-caused reductions have a smaller effect in market dynamics. 
On the other hand, if the VaR limit takes a high value, then agents are less likely to reach their 
limit, and so price dynamics do not differ much from the case in which agents do not manage 
their risk (in fact, a scenario with a high enough VaR limit is equivalent to a model without 
VaR). 
 
Although the mean of the different instability indicators over the 50 runs decreases when agents 
use a VaR limit above 26LVaR , it can be observed that instability is still important for higher 
values of LVaR  in a handful of runs (see the outliers of boxplots in Figure 12). In these runs 
market dynamics still exhibit episodes of VaR cycles, but their frequency and/or duration 








Figure 12 – Evolution of instability indicators when the VaR limit increases from 5 to 65. From top to 
bottom: return volatility, return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and agent strength index. 
 
The behavior of the various indicators across the different experiments leads us to conclude that 
the market is particularly stable when the limits are either very restrictive or very loose. It is for 
intermediate values of the VaR that prices show the most interesting dynamics, with the 
appearance of VaR cycles when the risk-driven portfolio reductions have a noticeable effect on 
prices and volatility. We note that there is no need to consider unrealistic values of the VaR 
limit for instability episodes to appear: VaR cycles are most likely to appear for 
,4411LVaR  which correspond approximately to 11% -45% of the average value of traders’ 
portfolio, and in real markets it is quite probable that a financial institution facing losses of this 




3.4. Effect of variable VaR limits 
So far we have assumed that VaR limits are constant along time. However, real-world financial 
institutions adjust these limits based on their risk and return (Saita, 2007). As Jorion (2001) 
indicates, in times of heightened volatility it is sensible to reduce the maximum VaR threshold. 
Nonetheless, the adjustment of risk limits can exacerbate the potentially destabilising effect of 
VaR systems since in moments of financial turmoil the reduction of VaR limits adds up to the 
increase of portfolio VaR and both mechanisms urge traders to further reduce their positions. 
 
To study the extent to which the dynamic adjustment of VaR limits contributes to market 
instability, we next consider a variation of our model where traders update their VaR limit as a 
function of market volatility. When current volatility t  is greater than the historical volatility 
t  (calculated as the average volatility over the last 200 ticks), the agents warily reduce their 
VaR limit as they interpret the market to be more unstable; when current volatility lies under 






 0 . ( 17 ) 
 
To study the effect of variable VaR limits, we repeat the experiments in section 3.3, but 
implementing variable VaR limits: investors are heterogeneous in their volatility window, and 
have the same VaR limit. All parameters remain constant across the experiments except for the 
initial VaR limit, which increases from 50 LVaR  to 650 LVaR : 
65...,,11,8,50 LVaR  
)30,10(~ Uw  
Traders adjust their VaR limit based on market volatility during the course of simulations. 
 
Figure 13 summarises the evolution of the different instability indicators when the initial VaR 
limit increases from 50 LVaR  to 650 LVaR . These experiments reassert the results obtained 
for constant VaR limits in section 3.3, that is, VaR cycles appear more frequently when the 
initial VaR limit takes intermediate values (reaching the maximum instability levels around 
1180 LVaR ). When 0LVaR  takes a very small value, even though traders adjust their VaR 
limit along simulations, they have no room to accumulate large positions because their VaR 
easily gets above the limit and are forced to partially liquidate their portfolio; when 0LVaR  
takes a high value, then it is less probable that agents reach their limit and market becomes more 
stable, though VaR cycles still appear in a significant number of runs (see the number of ouliers 
in the boxplots, much higher than for constant VaR limit in Figure 12). 
 
For the sake of comparability, the graphics in Figure 13 not only show the average of the 
different instability indicators across the experiments for variable VaR limits – in red –, but also 
the average across the experiments for constant VaR limits – in green – (displayed in section 








Figure 13 – Evolution of instability indicators when the initial VaR limit increases from 5 to 65. From 




These experiments show that if traders reduce their tolerance to risk during episodes of market 
turmoil, VaR systems have an even greater potential to heighten market instability. It is 
important to be aware of this point, because while some investors – such as hedge funds – are 
able to bear price fluctuations and portfolio losses for a while, other market participants are 
more risk averse and quickly react to first signs of instability in order to reduce their losses 
(IMF, 2007); under such circumstances, dynamically reducing VaR limits is a sensible measure 
at the individual level, but at the collective level the picture looks quite different, as this 
aggravates the spirals of sales and price drops. 
 
3.5. Summary of results 
In section 3.2 we have studied the effect of the volatility window used within the VaR model, 
and have seen that VaR cycles are more likely to appear when traders use a short-term volatility, 
that is, when a low value for the volatility window is considered. In sections 3.3 and 3.4 we 
have studied the effect of the VaR limit, and we have seen that the market is most stable when 
investors use very restrictive or very loose thresholds, while the use of intermediate values of 
VaR limit facilitates the emergence of VaR cycles. 
 
In the experiments for the volatility window run in section 3.2, investors always kept the same 
VaR limit, which took values between LVaR = 30 and LVaR = 50. Analogously, in the 
experiments for the VaR limit run in sections 3.3 and 3.4, investors kept constant their volatility 
window, which took values between w
σ 
= 10 and w
σ 
= 30. Keeping fixed the rest of parameters 
has allowed us to clearly identify the effect of the volatility window or the VaR limit. 
 
In this section we provide a broader outlook on the impact of the volatility window and the VaR 
limit parameters. For instance, we know that the market is more unstable when agents use a 
short-term volatility, but these results have been obtained for a given range of values for the 
VaR limit. Is this still true if investors use higher or lower VaR limits? To get a better 
perspective on the market dynamics obtained for other values of VaR model parameters, we 
summarise in Figure 14 the behaviour of the different instability indicators when the VaR limit 
takes values from LVaR = 5 to LVaR = 65 and the window volatility takes values from w
σ 





. Figure 15 shows the same graphics for the case of variable VaR limit. In all the 
contour plots the colour red identifies the most unstable situation (for example, the highest 
values of volatility or the lowest values of the Hill index). 
 
The graphs in Figure 14 and Figure 15 corroborate the results obtained in sections 3.2 – 3.4. 
Several indicators point out that the most unstable scenario is achieved when investors use a 
small window to calculate volatility and they moreover use an intermediate VaR limit; return 
volatility and Hill index are particularly clear in this regard. Moreover, it can be noticed that 
instability is higher when variable VaR limits are used. For example, in Figure 14 return 
volatility reaches a maximum value of 30%, whereas in Figure 15, when agents are using 
variable VaR limits, volatility can rise up to 70% in the worst case. The same pattern is 
observed for all indicators. 
 
                                                     
11 The value of the instability indicators shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15 is an average over 50 runs for 
each pair of values of VaR limit and volatility window. In the case of the investor strength index, it is an 





Figure 14 – Graphical summary of instability indicators when the VaR limit (x-axis) increases from 5 to 65 







Figure 15 – Graphical summary of instability indicators when the initial VaR limit (x-axis) increases from 5 
to 65 and the volatility window (y-axis) increases from 5 to 50. In this case, investors use a variable VaR 
limit. Colour red identifies the most unstable situation. 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
In recent times the use of risk management systems has become widespread, and VaR has come 
to be the main methodology at most financial institutions. VaR models assume that risk is 
exogenous, that is, prices are not affected by actions of financial institutions that are trying to 
estimate the risk of their portfolio ( (Morris & Shin, 2000), (Danielsson, et al., 2001)). This is 
possibly right most of the time, when investors trade with different strategies and criteria; but it 
is precisely those (even if very rare) occasions when investors act in a uniform way that are of 
interest, since traders’ aggregate action can move the prices and trigger an instability spiral. The 
use of VaR systems is precisely one of the mechanisms that contribute to homogenise the 
behaviour of market participants: when – for any reason – volatility goes up, so does the VaR of 
investors and in case it exceeds the limit, agents are forced to reduce their portfolio at the same 
time. If, in addition, traders hold similar positions, the way is paved for portfolio reductions to 
plunge the price, increase the volatility and raise again the traders’ VaR. It is therefore a 
scenario of endogenous risk, since the use of VaR systems has the potential to amplify market 
instability and feed it back. 
 
In this article we have studied in which circumstances VaR systems do amplify price 
fluctuations and lead to instability bouts, even in the absence of external shocks. To this aim, we 
have built an agent-based model, which can capture both the effect that market has on individual 
investors as well as the global effect that emerges from the aggregation of individual actions. 
We have considered a model of fundamentalist and technical traders which manage their risk 
with a simple VaR model and must reduce their positions when the risk of their portfolio goes 
above a given threshold. We have analised the impact of the widespread use of VaR systems on 
different financial instability indicators – volatility, return kurtosis, Hill index of returns and 
trader strength – and we have confirmed that, in a certain number of runs, VaR models induce a 
particular price dynamics that rises market volatility. These dynamics, which we have called 
‘VaR cycles’, take place when a sufficient number of traders reach their VaR limit and are 
forced to simultaneously reduce their portfolio; the reductions cause a sudden price movement, 
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upsurge volatility and force even more traders to liquidate part of their positions due to the new 
increase of their VaR. This type of dynamics supports the theory that the generalisation of VaR 
systems may give rise to vicious circles as claimed e.g. by Persaud (2000) or Danielsson et al. 
(2001). 
 
Our model has allowed us to analyse the impact, ceteris paribus, of the different parameters of 
the VaR model on the instability indicators. The following brief discussion summarises our 
findings: 
 VaR limit: The market is particularly stable when investors set very restrictive or very 
loose limits for their VaR level. A low VaR threshold heavily constrains the positions 
that agents can take, and so their VaR-induced reductions have a small effect in market 
dynamics. On the other hand, if agents set a high VaR threshold, it is less likely that 
they reach their limit, and so price dynamics do not differ much from the non-VaR 
scenario. In the light of these results, we might conclude that it would be most 
appropriate for market stability not to use any risk-management system, or to impose 
very restrictive standards to market participants. However, both scenarios are 
unrealistic: the lack of risk-management policies would expose the market to other 
sources of instability not contemplated in our model; an overly restrictive policy would 
significantly restrict the trading freedom of market participants, and this has been 
shown to reduce market efficiency (Takahashi, 2013). 
 Volatility window: When agents use a short-term window to calculate volatility, it turns 
out to be quite sensitive to price movements, and VaR cycles apppear more frequently. 
Our experiments show that using a medium- or long-term window to calculate volatility 
highly reduces market instability. These results ‘exonerate’ Basel Accords from the 
suspicion of contributing to exacerbate market turmoil, as VaR-based capital 
requirements are calculated with at least one year of historical data, and so volatility 
slowly reacts to market movements. However, when VaR is employed to control the 
risk of traders’ positions, using a short-term window is the usual practice as this allows 
to promptly react to deteriorating market conditions (Finger, 2009). 
 Variable VaR limit: When traders are allowed to dinamically adjust their VaR limit on 
the basis of market volatility, this aggravates the potentially destabilising effect of VaR 
systems compared to the constant-limit scenario, because in times of financial turmoil, 
the reduction of VaR limits adds up to the increase of portfolio VaR and both 
mechanisms urge traders to further reduce their positions. 
 
While our results indicate that the widespread use of VaR-based risk management systems 
actually contributes to increase financial instability, this does not mean that this type of systems 
should no longer be used. The main message to be extracted from our work is that risk 
managers and regulators must be aware of the endogenous risk and the particular dynamics 
potentially induced by VaR models and take action to address them. Risk management systems 
should be combined with other types of measures, such as stress tests. At present, numerous 
entities conduct stress tests, but they only focus on the individual institution and analyse if the 
entity, considered in isolation, would be able to withstand a shock; stress tests do not 
contemplate the fact that entities react to the shock and this has a ripple effect on other 
institutions – the fragility of some participants can be transmitted to others – and those 
institutions that were able to weather the initial shock can end up failing (Bookstaber, Cetina, 
Feldberg, Flood, & Glasserman, 2013). Stress tests should be able to somehow reflect the two-
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way relationship between market conditions and investor behavior: when market gets more 
volatile, participants react, and these can worsen market conditions with their own behaviour, 
originating a spiral of dangerous consequences. 
 
In addition, regulators should consider the homogenising effect that certain policies – such as 
Basel Accords – create on market participants’ behaviour. New regulations should focus not 
only on the stability of individual institutions, but policy makers should analyse the systemic 
effect of adopting such regulations and their potential contribution to instabilising spirals before 
implementing them. 
 
Although we have focused exclusively on the VaR-based risk management systems, the 
mechanisms we have studied here are essentially the same than those underlying other risk-
management practices (IMF, 2007). For instance, hedge funds and other leveraged entities 
borrow from their prime broker, who sets a margin level to hedge against possible losses. 
Primer brokers often adjust the margin threshold in order to control their own VaR 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009), and this implies that in moments of heightened volatility 
hedge funds are forced to post more collateral or reduce their positions, possibly triggering a 
spiral of sales similar to that described here for VaR systems. For this reason, the market 
dynamics described in this article go beyond VaR models and constitute an illustration of the 
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Appendix A: Robustness analysis 
One difficulty associated to agent-based models is the calibration of the usually numerous set of 
parameters against real data (Thurner, 2011). In this section we analyse the robustness of the 
model results with respect to changes in parameter values. To this aim, we perform a sensitivity 
analysis using the one-factor-at-a-time methodology (ten Broeke, van Voorn, & Ligtenberg, 
2016), varying one parameter at a time to observe its impact on results.  
We use an extreme case analysis (Taylor M. , 2009) where we choose an upper and lower bound 
for each parameter and re-run the experiments to compare the results with the base case shown 
in section 3. The extreme bounds have been selected as the lowest and highest values of each 
parameter (1) that make sense (e.g., the long-term window used by technical traders cannot be 
smaller than the short-term window), and (2) for which the basic model where agents use no 
VaR still satisfies the stylised facts described in section 2.2.5. 
Next, we repeat the experiments done in sections 3.1-3.4 for the three values of parameters: the 
base value, the lower bound and the upper bound. In Figure A. 1-Figure A. 11 we provide a 
summary of the results: to avoid repetitive figures we only show the effect on return volatility as 
the other instability indicators behave similarly; we have moreover opted for representing only 
the mean of this indicator (instead of the entire boxplot as in Figure 5, Figure 11-Figure 13) 
because this allows to neatly present the results under the three scenarios – base, low, and high 
value of each parameter – on a single graph and facilitates their comparison. As it can be seen 
below, it turns out that results are robust to other parameter choices, as Figure A. 1-Figure A. 11 
show the same qualitative behaviour than those shown in section 3. 
Table 2 summarises the value of all the parameters used in the robustness analyses shown in 









  400 350 450 Liquidity 
P  0.4 0 0.7 
Standard deviation for random term 
in price formation 
FUNDN  200 150 250 Number of fundamentalist traders 
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TRENDN  200 150 250 Number of technical traders 
V  0.25 0 0.5 
Standard deviation for random term 
in fundamental value formation 
],[ maxmin vv  [-8, 8] [-0.5, 0.5] [-20, 20] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the difference 
between the fundamental value and 
the value perceived by each 
fundamentalist trader 
],[ maxmin TT  [2, 5] [1, 4] [7, 10] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the entry 
thresholds of fundamentalist traders 
],[ maxmin   [-0.5, 1] [-1.5, 0] [0.5, 2] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the exit 





S ww  [5, 15] [2, 12] [10, 20] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the window of 






L ww  [35, 50] [20, 35] [60, 75] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the window of 
long-term moving average used by 





C ww  [5, 30] [1, 26] [15, 40] 
Boundaries of the uniform 
distribution that sets the window of 
exit channel used by technical 
traders 





Robustness for parameter   
  
  
Figure A. 1 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameter  . Top left: The percentage of 
agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases from 5 to 50. 
Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR limit is variable 




Robustness for parameter P  
  
  
Figure A. 2 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameter P . Top left: The percentage 
of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases from 5 to 50. 
Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR limit is variable 




Robustness for parameter FUNDN  
  
  
Figure A. 3 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameter FUNDN . Top left: The 
percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases 
from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR 




Robustness for parameter TRENDN  
  
  
Figure A. 4 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameter TRENDN . Top left: The 
percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases 
from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR 




Robustness for parameter V  
  
  
Figure A. 5 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameter V . Top left: The percentage 
of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases from 5 to 50. 
Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR limit is variable 




Robustness for parameters ],[ maxmin vv  
  
  
Figure A. 6 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameters ],[ maxmin vv . Top left: The 
percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases 
from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR 




Robustness for parameters ],[ maxmin TT  
  
  
Figure A. 7 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameters ],[ maxmin TT . Top left: The 
percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases from 
5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR limit is 








Figure A. 8 – Evolution of return volatility for different values of  parameters ],[ maxmin  . Top left: The 
percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases 
from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR 
















S ww . Top left: 
The percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window 
increases from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: 








L ww  
  
  




L ww . Top left: 
The percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window increases 
from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: The VaR 








C ww  
  
  




C ww . Top left: 
The percentage of agents using VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Top right: The volatility window 
increases from 5 to 50. Bottom left: The VaR limit is constant and  increases from 5 to 65. Bottom right: 
The VaR limit is variable and its initial value increases from 5 to 65. 
 
